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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002753

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015

TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
TELEMETRY ISSUES, NOVEMBER 8, 2005

REF: A. STATE 231077

[B.](#) JCIC-XXV-043 (03 GENEVA 3025)

[C.](#) JCIC-XXVI-038 (04 GENEVA 2967)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

- [1.](#) (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-044.
- [2.](#) (U) Meeting Date: November 8, 2005
Time: 10:15 - 11:30 A.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[3.](#) (S) A working group meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on November 8, 2005, to discuss Russian concerns with U.S. telemetry information provided for a Peacekeeper (PK) flight-test of March 12, 2003, and Trident flight-test maneuvers. The Russian Delegation complained about the inability of Russian telemetry experts to convert the digital data from the U.S. PK flight-test into "video" code. The Russians indicated they had a problem with the timing references provided by the U.S. Additionally, the Russians raised, once again, the U.S. practice of Trident II flight-tests and their assertion that the U.S. is testing the missile with more reentry vehicle (RV) dispensing operations than the number of warheads attributed to it. The U.S. Delegation responded that it had heard nothing new in today's presentation and, as the U.S. had stated in the past, the U.S. is in full compliance with the Treaty, and has fulfilled all its obligations.

PEACEKEEPER FLIGHT-
TEST OF MARCH 12, 2003,
TELEMETRY RECORDINGS

- [4.](#) (S) At a working group meeting, held at the U.S. Mission on November 8, 2005, Razumov began by raising the issue of the U.S. PK ICBM flight-test of March 12, 2003. He stated that the Russians were still unable to play back telemetric data broadcast on frequency 2344.5 MHz recorded on tape 18. Russia still believed that the U.S. had used a new method of recording data, as stated in the Russian Non-Paper dated June 30, 2003 (REF A). He said that Russia understood the reason for the U.S. failure to respond to the question during JCIC-XXV because of the short notice in which the U.S. had received the non-paper. Subsequently, during JCIC-XXVI, the U.S. Delegation responded to the question, but only to state that the U.S. was in complete compliance with the Treaty (REF B). Razumov stated that Russia was not accusing the U.S. of violating the Treaty, but that it just wanted clarification on how to convert the digital data into "video" code so it could assess the telemetric information in question. (Begin comment: U.S. Delegation understood that Russia was referring to conversion of data to "digital" data and the use of the term video code was an error in translation. End comment.) As previously stated by the Russian Delegation, they still sought an answer to the question: "Does the Russian Federation need new equipment in addition to the Metrum 64 to read the information provided?" Razumov stated he understood that the Treaty provided for the Parties to determine their own recording practices, but said the other side must be able to play back the recordings. He attempted to discuss the definition of telemetric recording practices as stipulated in the Treaty. He acknowledged the long-standing differences in the Parties' interpretations of what constitutes "playback." He added that Russia's experts needed assistance in converting the digital data into what he termed as "video" code.
- [5.](#) (S) Mullins thanked Razumov for his comments and asked

whether there were any comments from the other Parties. Shevtsov remarked that Russia was justified in their concerns. He saw the need for a bilateral discussion on the matter in an effort to resolve this situation. He recalled how the Russian Federation assisted U.S. efforts to understand the new recording media (compact discs) used by Russia. He stated how Russia had provided everything the United States needed for the new method of reading recorded telemetric data.

16. (S) Mullins thanked Shevtsov for his comments, and asked Razumov to clarify whether Russia had an issue with the timing references provided by the United States. Razumov replied yes, there was a problem. It had taken Russia over a year to process the data provided, but it was still unable to assess the telemetric information because it could not link the telemetric information to the time reference, so there must have been a problem with the timing reference. He stated that, given the fact that Russian experts were unable to fully play back the telemetry, the U.S. must have used a new method to encode the timing reference. Mullins replied that Russia had received a full recording, and that it was everything that the United States also had. Razumov agreed, but said Russian experts still could not read it.

17. (S) Mullins stated that he would need to take Russia's concerns about timing data back to Washington. He also acknowledged the requirement for the other Parties to be able to play back the telemetric information, but the Treaty did not require the Parties to provide analytical equipment. Razumov, seeking further clarification asked, "What mode was used -- was it pre-detection or post-detection? Do you modulate the data or apply other algorithms to it? Does Russia need additional equipment to process this information?" Mullins replied, "Not for playback." Razumov asked whether the U.S. had any plans to use this recording method in the future. Mullins stated that it was possible, and asked the reason for the question. "We need it to verify the Treaty," replied Razumov.

TRIDENT II FLIGHT-
TEST PRACTICES

18. (S) Razumov discussed the U.S. practice of Trident II flight-tests. He acknowledged that this topic had been talked about in the past at length. To highlight Russia's concerns, he showed Mullins a table of Russia's analysis of dispensing maneuvers from Trident flight-tests which, he said, showed that the U.S. engaged in more RV dispensing operations than the number of warheads that are attributed to the missile. (Begin comment: This table is an update to the one previously provided in REF C, but includes additional flight data information for tests between February 26, 2004, and March 2, 2005. As the table cannot be put into a readable format for this cable, it will be E-mailed to the State Department separately for dissemination upon request. End comment.) Razumov asked the U.S. to bring its practices into compliance with the Treaty as the U.S. had done during the flight-tests between 2004 and 2005. (Begin comment: Russia has stated that it did not see any extra dispensing operations than the attributed number of warheads to the missile on the flight-tests conducted during this time. End comment.) In response, Mullins stated that the U.S. was in compliance and did not engage in the practice of testing missiles with more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to them.

19. (S) Shevtsov stated the importance and relevance of this portion of the Treaty. Although the intent of the Treaty was to permit verification of compliance, he understood that advancements in technology could make it impossible to distinguish dispensing operations from other maneuvers. He associated this situation with that of the proposed plenary statement of Trident II RVOSI procedures, saying that maybe this issue was not so important, without prejudice to Treaty provisions, of course. But, he said Ukraine supported the Russian position regarding this issue. He stated that, in his technical expert opinion, he did not see the need for nor understand the U.S. requirement for accomplishing extra procedures during flight-tests. He asked the U.S. to "just not do it."

110. (S) Mullins responded that the U.S. had not changed its testing practices, and was in complete compliance with the Treaty. He directed Razumov back to the Treaty definition of "procedures for dispensing RVs," which included a maneuver to an aim point and a release command for one or more RVs, whether or not an RV is actually released. He stated that, as told to the Parties in the past, the U.S. practice of conducting extra SCDM maneuvers was for range safety and test observation purposes. Mullins noted the only new idea presented was by Shevtsov's comment that the Treaty provision seemed to have lost its practical importance given that missile systems have become more sophisticated.

¶11. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Reference Data on the Number of Dispensing Maneuvers during Launches of U.S. SLBMs for the Period 1995 - 2005, dated November 8, 2005 (E-mailed to State/VCI)

¶12. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Mullins
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Deihl
Mr. Dunn
LCDR Feliciano
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Maj Mitchner
Mr. Singer
Dr. Zimmerman
Lt Col Zoubek
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov

Russia

Col Razumov
Lt Col Novikov
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran
Mr. Dotsenko
MGEN Fedotov

¶13. (U) Taylor sends.
Cassel